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SUMMARY 
The role of Deterrence and Retribution in sentencing in South 
African Courts 
Since the early history of the existence of humanity punishment 
has been meted out to transgressors of the laws of society. 
Informal sanctions, including ostracism are imposed by members of 
society for social transgressions. Formal punishment is imposed 
by courts through a system of criminal justice. 
This dissertation deals with the concept of punishment. It 
considers the significance of the theories of punishment in the 
sentencing process with particular reference to deterrence and 
retribution, the philosophical rationale for their use and thus 
their role in sentencing. 
In this study the historical evolution of retribution is traced 
and the recognition accorded particularly to retribution and 
deterrence as well as reformation and prevention as penal 
objectives at various periods in history is examined. 
Case law has been cited to determine their recognition by 
judicial practice in criminal courts. 
The study also reflects on the criminal justice system's clients' 
perceptions on sentencing. 
(i) 
KEY TERMS 
Punishment; theories of punishment; 
deterrence; retribution; penal objectives; 
sentencing; relative theory; utilitarian theory; 
criminal courts; justice 
(ii) 
DECLARATION 
Student Number 228-574-6 
I declare that this short dissertation entitled "THE ROLE OF 
DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION IN SENTENCING IN SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS 11 
is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or 
quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete 
references. 
SI~ 27 NOVEMBER 1996 
(iii) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am grateful to many people who contributed at various stages 
in various ways towards the production of this work. My 
appreciation specially goes to Professor S. S. Terblanche, my 
supportive supervisor and to the library staff of the University 
of South Africa for their efficient responses to my needs. 
(iv) 
CONTENTS 
Summary 
Key terms 
Declaration 
Acknowledgements 
Table of figures 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1. 4.1 
1. 4. 2 
1. 4. 3 
2. 
2.1 
2 .1. 1 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
Introduction 
Statement of problem 
Content, direction of research 
Research Methods used 
Literature survey 
Case law 
Interviews with semi-urbanised 
members of a community 
CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT 
Definition 
Punishment must be unpleasant for the 
person undergoing it 
PAGE 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(vii) 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
2 .1. 2 
2 .1. 3 
2.1.3.1 
Punishment must be imposed for an offence 7 
Punishment must be imposed on an,offender 7 
Deterministic view of criminal 8 
2.1.3.2 
2 .1. 4 
2 .1. 5 
2.2 
responsibility 
Indeterministic view of criminal 
responsibility 
Punishment is inflicted by authorised 
human agencies 
Punishment is imposed for a specific 
purpose 
Historical perspective 
( v) 
9 
9 
10 
11 
2.2.1 
2. 2. 2 
2. 2. 3 
2.2.4 
3 . 
3.1 
--3.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.2 
3.1.1.3 
3.1.1.4 
3.1.1.5 
3.1.1.6 
3. 1. 2 
- 3.1.2.1 
3 .1. 2. 2 
3.1.2.3 
3.1.2.4 
~ 3.1.3 
3 .1. 4 
4 
4.1 
4.2 
5 
5.1 
5.2 
The Primitive Period 
Classical School 
Neo-classical school 
Positivist School 
OBJECTIVES AND JUSTIFICATION OF 
PUNISHMENT 
General review 
Retribution - ~OV')C- p'<A-vl~~r 
Retribution and just deserts 
Retribution and vengeance 
Retribution as an opportunity 
for expiation and remorse 
Retribution and social solidarity 
Retribution and causality 
Retribution through the cases 
The Relative theories 
Deterrence 
Individual deterrence 
General deterrence 
Deterrence in case law 
The Preventive theory of punishment 
Reformation theory of punishment 
COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES ON 
PUNISHMENT 
The perceived erosion of deterrence 
A deficiency of the retributive element 
in sentencing 
CONCLUSION 
Findings 
Recommendations 
List of sources 
(vi) 
11 
11 
12 
13 
15 
15 
16 
22 
23 
25 
26 
26 
27 
29 
30 
30 
31 
35 
37 
37 
39 
39 
39 
44 
44 
50 
53 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
FIGURE NO. 
4.1 Jubilation at death sentence upon 
Captain Brian Mitchell 
PAGE NO. 
42 
4.2 View points - the page that tells you what 43 
people are thinking 
(vii) 
CHAPTER 1 
1. GENERAL 
1.1 Introduction 
The campaign for the abolition of the death penalty has, over the 
past few years, raged furiously. The efficacy of deterrent 
measures and the propriety of retribution in sentencing were 
called to question by various persons including some eminent 
jurists. With regard to deterrence for example Didcott J M. 1 
observed that "(i)t postulates someone contemplating the deed, 
and simultaneously weighing his consequences in a rational 
manner. That to my mind is unrealistic." On retribution he 
observed "This is unfashionable nowadays as a proclaimed goal. 
It tends to be equated with vengeance, and then to be viewed as 
barbarious, cruel and altogether offensive to civilised 
standards." In this he echoed a general perception shared by a 
number of other persons and jurists. 2 
Johanson3 observed that " ( q) ui te apart from many warnings against 
vengeance and revenge in the New Testament, the concept of 
retribution for a crime calls into question the fundamental 
meaning of the cross of Christ ... " As to deterrence he observed 
: "The deterrent value of capital punishment has been minutely 
examined and the findings are almost uniformly negative ... " It 
appears to be a serious indictment to the efficacy of deterrence 
if the ultimate in punishment is said not to deter. 
It is this that has deposited a desire to examine the role of 
deterrence and retribution in sentencing in South African courts. 
This work therefore essentially confines itself to the practice 
1 "Criminal justice and penology" ( 1980) SACC 296 i 
2 Kahn E "The death penalty in South Africa" (1970} 33 THRHR 
108 at 125; Van Niekerk B "Hanged by your neck until you are 
dead" (1970) SALJ 60 at 67 
3 "Capital punishment" (1971) 34 THRHR 350 at 358 
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in the criminal courts. It is essential to examine what these 
courts aim to achieve if they relate retribution and deterrence 
to their determination of sentences. 
1.2 Statement of problem 
The acceptability of the courts to the communities they serve 
depends, to a large measure, on their perceived effectiveness in 
the protection of society against crime as epitomised in their 
response thereto. Surveys by various instances in South Africa 
confirm what is common knowledge, the escalation of crime. A 
recent survey published in Finance Week4 compares the crime rate 
from January 1 to 31 October 1994 with that of the same period 
in 1990 and reflects the following percentage increases in the 
various crimes:-
Armed robbery (up) 16% 
Fraud 11% 
Malicious damage to property 7% 
Serious crime 8% 
General crime 5% 
Vehicle theft 36% 
Hijackings - cars 38% 
Hijackings - trucks 44% 
Child abuse 35% 
The survey observes that South Africa has an annual murder rate 
of 53.5 per 100 000 people compared to an international average 
of 5 per 100 000. 
The courts have not escaped blame from certain sectors of the 
community who perceive the courts as failing to despatch the 
right messages to the crime world. In their sentencing response 
to crime there is perceived an erosion of the considerations of 
deterrence and retribution. 
4 "National Party National Anti-crime strategy crime pays" 
October 26 November 1 1995 at 10. 
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1.3 Content, direction of research 
As the title indicates, this work seeks to examine the 
significance of the theories of deterrence and retribution, to 
examine the philosophical rationale for their use and thus their 
role in sentencing and, by way of case law study to determine 
their recognition by judicial practice in the criminal courts, 
hopefully to confirm my hypothesis that in the South African 
courts deterrence and retribution constitute pillar 
considerations in sentencing. It also seeks to reflect briefly 
on the general perceptions prevailing in certain sectors of the 
community - the clients of the service - with regard to these 
objectives in so far as they interpret the sentences imposed by 
the courts. 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS USED 
The research focused on the criminal justice system. The 
research methods involved literature survey, interviews with 
people from a semi-urbanised community and a case law study. 
1.4.1 Literature survey 
A study of published sources reflecting philosophical submissions 
touching on the topic of this work was undertaken. Foreign 
literature as well as South African sources were studied. 
1.4.2 Case law 
In South Africa a vast source of case law has developed in the 
sphere of criminal law dealing with the aspect of punishment. 
It was examined with particular reference to the principles of 
deterrence and retribution, the purpose being to determine the 
attitude of these courts on the principles. For purposes of this 
work it is primarily the decisions of the Supreme Court that have 
been consulted as it is the Supreme Court which has, from time 
immemorial, set precedents binding on inferior courts, 
particularly those of magistrates, through its decisions on 
punishment. The courts of traditional leaders, the Chiefs, 
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headmen and Chiefs' deputies upon which criminal jurisdiction was 
conferred in terms of section 20 of the Black Administration Act 
No.38 of 1927 have also received some attention in this study. 
1.4.3 Interviews with semi-urbanised members of a community 
Since this study focused on items of major importance to the 
clients of the criminal justice system, the community, their 
perceptions were considered as important to survey. 
The method of the interviews was informal and not structured. 
It was considered that a structured interview format would not 
have been flexible enough to capture the unexpected and to allow 
opinions and perspectives to flow freely and to allow for issues 
outside the pre-planned agenda for discussion. 
An opportunity was obtained by taking advantage of a large 
gathering which had just concluded its business at one of its 
bi-monthly regional authority meetings held at Nongoma, a semi-
urbanised district in KwaZulu-Natal. The gathering comprised 
traditional leaders, educated and professional persons, a number 
of whom were well known to me, who r~present various interests 
in the community at such meetings, as well as persons from the 
rural expanse of that district. Short informal interviews with 
specific persons were also held. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT 
2.1 Definition 
The role of retribution and deterrence resides in punishment. 
It behoves this work to discuss the concept of punishment. 
Punishment may be defined from a legal, moral, religious and 
pedagogical perspective. Its potential exists in all situations 
in which an authority and subordinate relationship exists. 5 
This work confines itself to the legal definition as that 
definition relates relevantly to a discussion involving the 
criminal justice system. 
Punishment is the authoritative infliction of suffering for an 
offence. 6 Van der Merwe7 aligns himself with the definition 
which conveys that sentencing is a public quantification of the 
individual offender's blameworthiness, determined according to 
acceptable standards of proportionality. 
/ 
Primoratz8 defines punishment as "an evil deliberately inflicted 
qua -evil on an offender by a ?uman agency which is authorised by 
the legal order whose laws the offender had violated". He 
explains that by offender he means a person who has offended 
against any positive criminal law, no matter whether that law is 
just or unju~, whether it is an expression of a condition of 
universal freedom or of a tyrant's arbitrary will, whether it is 
morally legitimate or not. 9 
s 'van der Merwe DP Sentencing (1991) at 3-8 
6 Burchell et al South African Criminal Law and Procedure I; 
General Principles of Criminal Law (1983) at 66-67 
7 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 3-23 
8 Justifying legal punishment (1989) at 1 
9 Primoratz op cit note 8 at 3 
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Gammage and Hemphill 10 view punishment as a restrictive measure 
imposed by the courts for breach of legal observance. It is 
sanctioned by the criminal law. 
Flew A11 views all punishment, be it formal (as enforced by the 
judicial system) and informal (as enforced by the church, the 
school, etc for example), as having the characteristics of (1) 
"evil" and unpleasantness to the person undergoing it; (2) it 
must be for an offence; (3) it must be for an offender (4) it 
must be by authorised human agencies and (5) it must be imposed 
by virtue of some special authority conferred through or by the 
institution against whose laws or rules the offence has been 
committed. To effect a penological definition Flew's elements 
have been adapted by addition of the element that punishment is 
imposed and implemented with a specific purpose. 12 
2.1.1 Punishment must be unpleasant for the person undergoing 
it 
Flew13 particularly used the word "evil" in discussing this 
element. This excluded reference to pain as would be experienced 
in corporal punishment or physical suffering. Taking issue with 
the use of "evil" and "unpleasant" JD Mabott14 points out that 
modern penology has very few punishments that involve physical 
or mental suffering. Modern day punishment is characterised by 
the withholding of something good. Imprisonment deprives the 
offender of his liberty and the fines, of his possessions. 
"Evil" does not restrict punishment to any particular form. 
10 Basic Criminal law (1979) at 46-47 
11 "Justification of punishment" in Acton The Philosophy of 
punishment (1969) London MacMillan at 85-87 
12 Neser JJ "'n teoreties-prinsipieele studie van sekere 
aspekte van die straf en behandeling van die oortreder van 
uit 'n penologiese perspektief" (1980) D Phil. Thesis 
University of South Africa Pretoria at 63 
13 op cit note 11 at 85 
14 "Professor Flew on punishment" Acton supra note 11 at 117 
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2.1.2 Punishment must be imposed for an offence 
Punishment must be perceived as a manifestation of the society's 
value system. Society will institute penalties and punishments 
reflecting its value in respect of any particular action of which 
it disapproves. Some of the values are so highly regarded by 
society that they are enshrined in the laws of the country. The 
offence referred to here is one against the laws and not a 
11 sin 11 • 15 Punishment cannot be imposed if the person has been 
found not guilty as punishment is destined for infliction only 
on those who are guilty of an offence. 16 
2.1.3 Punishment must be imposed on an offender 
Punishment can properly only be inflicted on the responsible 
offender, only on one who can be held responsible for the 
commission of the offence. Baier17 states that the offender must 
be accountable, answerable and culpable. The element of 
accountability envisages the kind of person who can be held 
responsible. This excludes young children under the age of 7 
years and the insane. 
'Responsibility' here envisages 11 ••• first the ability (of a 
person) to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and, 
secondly the ability to conduct himself in accordance with such 
an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct 11 • 18 A person 
is culpable if he cannot give reasons why he should not be 
answerable for his actions or if in the eyes of the law he may 
be blamed for his unlawful conduct. 19 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Mabott in Acton op cit note 14 at 118 
Baier "Is punishment retributive" Acton op cit note 11 at 132 
op cit note 11 at 131 
Snyman Criminal Law (1995) 3rd edition Durban Butterworths 
at 146 
Snyman op cit note 18 at 149 
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The debate on man's responsibility for his conduct revel ves 
around two views, namely the deterministic and the 
indeterministic. 
2.1.3.1 Deterministic view of criminal responsibility 
The doctrine of determinism can be defined as conveying that for 
every event in the universe, there is a set of conditions such 
that if the conditions were repeated, the event should be 
repeated. Hospers also submits that everything that happens has 
a cause. 20 
The strictly deterministic view holds that an individual can 
never choose what he wishes to do because what he does is 
predestined. He can therefore not be held responsible as he 
could not have acted differently and should be absolved from 
criminal liability for his behaviour as he would have no control 
over his actions. 
There is however an argument that an offender 1 s behaviour is 
detrimental to society and is a threat to its welfare. This 
confers a right and casts a duty upon society to take steps to 
counteract the threat on that basis. 
The offender is held to be accountable for his conduct and is 
made answerable for his behaviour. Punishment is then justified 
as social defence. 
Although the determinists reject freedom of choice, the principle 
of causation holds that the consequences of one 1 s behaviour 
cannot be avoided. He must accept responsibility for his 
behaviour and its consequences. Punishment is imposed as an 
20 Hospers Readings in introductory philosophical analysis 
(1969) London Routledge & Kegan Paul at 502 
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unpleasant result of crime. Positive conduct attracts pleasant 
results. 21 
The determinists concede that every individual does have a sense 
of responsibility, but they regard it as a product of· genetic 
inheritance influenced by the environment in which it occurs. 
The criminal is accountable because he has in him the forces that 
cause him to be a criminal and not because he has freely chosen 
to be a crimina1. 22 
2.1.3.2 Indeterministic view of criminal responsibility 
The individual has freedom of choice of action. The offender 
therefore should be held responsible because he has insight into 
his behaviour, has fore knowledge of consequences of his 
behaviour and appreciates that his criminal action is wrong and 
is in a position to act in terms of this appreciation except in 
cases where his reasoning powers are limited or influenced in 
which case his responsibility will accord with the degree of 
curtailment of freedom of choice of action. The indeterminists 
hold that circumstances cannot give rise to criminal behaviour 
as the individual has the ability to rise above the influence of 
circumstances. 2 3 
2.1.4 Punishment is inflicted by authorised human agencies 
For the infliction of suffering upon an offender to be regarded 
as punishment, the suffering must be inflicted by a human agency. 
Punishment is distinguishable from penalties. "Evils occurring 
to people as the result of misbehaviour, but not by human agency, 
may be called penalties but not punishments; thus unwanted 
21 Hospers op cit note 20 at 107-108 
22 Caldwell Criminology (1965) 2nd edition New York Ronald Press 
at 428 
23 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 1-2F 
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children and venereal disease may be the penalties of, but not 
the punishment for sexual promiscuity". 24 
A further distinction relates to punishment for a moral 
transgression, a distinction which Mabott supports by reference 
to the fact that in punishment two parties are involved. "For a 
moral offence, God alone has the status necessary to punish the 
offender". 25 Any rule-making authority or its agents is 
competent to impose punishment. 26 The position in South Africa 
is that the rules that are drawn up by the State as well as those 
which constitute the common law are enforced by it and where they 
are infringed it sees to the apprehension of offenders. 
Punishment is inflicted by the State because it is its laws that 
have been violated. It is inflicted through the courts. 
2.1.5 Punishment is imposed for a specific purpose 
Punishment must be implemented in such a manner that its purpose 
is achieved. In this regard the objetives of punishment will 
influence the nature of the punishment so that the appropriate 
sentence is imposed. 27 Retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation 
and protection of the community are the objectives referred to 
here. 
24 Hospers Human conduct : an introduction to the problems of 
ethics (1963) London Hart Davis at 394 
25 Mabott in Acton op cit note 11 at 41 
26 Mabott in Acton op cit note 11 at 119 
27 Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika (1981) Cape Town Juta & Co. at 
100 
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2.2 Historical perspective 
2.2.1 The primitive period 
Pri~itive communities maintained, observed and enforced clearly 
defined customary rules of conduct. 28 Their breaches were 
visited by sanctions which included brutal extermination of the 
offender. During this period there was no acknowledgement that 
the punishment should be commensurate with the crime committed. 
In this period communities existed as units related in blood. 
They regarded it as a religious duty to avenge wrongs to their 
members. Responsibility was collective. Vengeance was brought 
upon the whole group to which an offender belonged and not upon 
the offender only. 29 
Atonement was a major penal consideration. 30 It was an atonement 
to the gods, to protect the community against evil influences 
unleashed by the crime. 
2.2.2 Classical School 
During the middle ages the state gradually gained control over 
the administration of punishment which, at that primitive era, 
was characterised by blood vengeance. However under the 
influence or religious dogmatism and feudal tyranny the judges 
imposed extremely cruel punishments which bore no relation to the 
seriousness of the crime. The punishment was only designed to 
deter. Justice suffered a sharp decline. Trials merely served 
to extract confessions through torture, which was admissible. 31 
28 Barnes The story of punishment : a record of man's inhumanity 
to man (1972) 2nd edition revised Montclair NJ Patterson 
Smith at 38 
29 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 2-2 
30 Kahn "Crime and punishment" (1960) 1910-1960 Acta juridica 
at 191 
31 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 2-2 
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Beccaria in Italy, and his contemporary, Bentham in England were 
among the most distinguished classical theorists who rebelled 
against this corrupt system of law. 
during this era was deterrence. 
The main consideration 
The underlying philosophy was that the human will was free and 
could be influenced by fear - especially fear of pain. 
Punishment was acceptable as the principal method of creating 
fear necessary to influence the will and thus to control the 
behaviour. 32 
Beccaria advocated a practice of punishment whose severity was 
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. 33 So did 
Bentham. 34 Beccaria also argued that the purpose of punishment 
was the prevention of crime and not revenge, and, as to the 
degree of punishment, he emphasised that certainty, expedition 
and not severity were best to ensure deterrence. 35 
The classical school's propagation of deterrence as an objective 
of punishment and their particularisation of free will and choice 
have survived to constitute a basis for modern day theories of 
punishment. 
2.2.3 Neo-classical School 
In the 19th century, in the era of this school, the penal 
objectives remained the same as they were in the classical 
period. The developments of this school are recorded as 
32 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 2-7 
33 Ibid 
34 Reid Crime and Criminology (1991) 6th edition Fort Worth 
Holt Rinehart & Wintson at 92 
35 Barnes op cit note 28 at 98 
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consisting of modifications to the idea of free will which 
resulted in it losing some ground in the realisation that an 
offender might, in certain circumstances not be fully responsible 
for his actions. The state of mind of the offender was taken 
into account. 36 Children under the age of 7 years of age would 
be exempt from criminal liability. Mental disease as a cause for 
impairment of responsibility was recognised. 37 
2.2.4 Positivist School 
Cesare Lombroso may be regarded as the first prime exponent of 
this school. This period experienced a shift of emphasis from 
the crime to the criminal and a determinist approach which viewed 
crime as the product of purely natural factors that left no room 
for free will. More attention was paid to the crime-provoking 
factors. 38 
The deterministic approach of social scientists tended to 
perceive the offender as a helpless victim of society with 
society as the villain who should actually feel guilty for 
causing the crime. 
Sentencing patterns were influenced. With the advent of the 
positivist school of criminology, which emphasised rehabilitation 
rather than retribution, "· ... the judge was to be concerned not 
only with the crime ... but with the treatment of the criminal as 
well .... " 39 The positivist school therefore, virtually laid the 
foundations for further development of the philosophy of 
rehabilitation which, in modern sentencing practices has been an 
important factor. One of the chief results of the work of the 
positivists was that the offender was seen as an individual. 
36 Van der Merwe op cit note at 2-8 
37 Reid op cit note 34 at 93 
38 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 2-9 
39 Duffee & Fitch An introduction to corrections : a policy and 
systems approach (1976) California Goodyear at 70-71 
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The position of rehabilitation as a penal objective will be 
alluded to in the discussion of penal objectives in the present 
century. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OBJECTIVES AND JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT 
3.1 General review 
When a person is brought before court accused of having committed 
a crime, when the prosecution, the defence and the court engage 
in a process to determine whether he is guilty of the alleged 
crime or not, the ultimate object is the punishment of the 
accused if he is convicted of the crime. 
It is essential to address the question as to why the state 
punishes people, particularly in the light of doubts by some 
people as to the propriety thereof. Various reasons are advanced 
for the expressed doubts, one being that the state itself 
directly or indirectly creates the climate for criminality. The 
aspect of punishment has evolved from the primitive era, through 
the phases which took into account the needs of society as a 
priority, particularly in terms of protection as well as the 
needs of the offender as an individual, in terms of reformation. 
The classical, neo-classical and positivist eras all contributed 
to the fashioning of the modern philosophy of punishment. 
In the assessment of an appropriate sentence the courts also pay 
regard to what was referred to by Davis AJA as the main purposes 
of punishment in R v Swanepoel 40 to be deterrence, prevention, 
reformation and retribution. 
These are generally referred to as the theories of punishment. 
They are classified and distinguished as the absolute theory, the 
relative theory and the unitary theory. The relative theories 
are further classified into the preventive, reformative and 
deterrent theories. The latter is subdivided into general and 
individual deterrence. The retributive theory is the only 
40 1945 AD 444 at 455 
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absolute theory. 41 This work will focus primarily on the role of 
retribution and deterrence in sentencing. 
In S v Khumalo 42 the court expressed the main principle of 
sentencing thus : "Punishment must fit the criminal as well as 
the crime, be fair to society, and be blended with a measure of 
mercy according to circumstances." 
The "main purposes" of punishment referred to above are in 
practice considered alongside the principle enunciated in S v 
Khumalo supra. In this respect in considering the criminal the 
court may, in the light of his personal and other circumstances 
pass a sentence to effect individual deterrence or one that is 
conducive to reformation. Reformation is of course considered 
by the courts mainly in the context of the interests of society, 
namely its protection. The interests of society are also served 
by imposition of sentences of general deterrent, preventive or 
retributive nature. 
3.1.1 Retribution 
The desire to revenge, the belief that retributive punishment is 
just, is to a very considerable degree entrenched in the general 
population. 43 
The earliest examples of sentencing focussed on the goal of 
retribution. Blood vengeance characterised the reaction to crime 
by primitive tribes. In its historical primitive form retribution 
is rooted in the right of requittal in terms whereof an 
individual could avenge himself or a member of his family by 
punishing the transgressor in like manner. 44 The Biblical 
41 Snyman op cit note 18 at 18 
42 1973(3) SA 697 (A) at 698 
43 Rabie and Strauss Punishment an introduction to principles 
(1985) 4th edition Lex Patria at 47 
44 Kahn "Symposium on capital punishment" 1975 Acta juridica 
220-244 at 225 
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prescription that"· .. if there is serious injury you are to take 
life for a life ... , eye for eye, tooth for tooth, burn for burn, 
wound for wound, bruise for bruise prevailed. 45 The reaction of 
society towards the offender was determined exclusively by a 
concern for the victim and the community. Some people grieve 
today that the law appears to be exclusively concerned with the 
rights of the offender. 
The principle of inflicting suffering for its own sake was 
predominant. 
It was only after the rise of the state in the 13th century that 
the state intervened and gradually assumed control of the 
administration of punishment that retribution emerged as what was 
regarded as an aim of punishment. Crime then began to be 
recognised as a violation of the authority of the state and as 
a challenge to law and order. 46 
Retribution enjoys prominent recognition in domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions. With reference to the latter, in Harris v 
Alabama, 47 it was acknowledged as a proper and prominent goal of 
sentencing. It is the case with various other jurisdictions. 
It has been hailed as one of the oldest and most universal 
motives of punishment. 
Tappan48 comments that through the history of civilisation it 
appears to have been the most prevalent and continuously 
persistent correctional motive. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Holy Bible (1991) New International version International 
Bible Society Colorado Exodus 21 : 23-25 
Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 2-2 
352 So. 2d 479 (Ala.1977) 
Crime, justice and correction (1960) New York Me Graw-Hill at 
241 
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Although retribution has, in this work been lumped together with 
deterrence, reformation and prevention where objectives of 
punishment are discussed, it cannot properly be referred to as 
an objective. In an illuminating discussion of the nature of 
retribution, Terblanche49 highlights the similarity of the 
characteristics of retribution with those of "behoorlike, 
konsekwente, regverdige vonnis-oplegging," and he points out that 
the " ... ooreenstemming in kenmerke dui op so 'n sterk verband 
tussen vergelding en straftoemeting dat di t die argument dat 
vergelding en straftoemeting eintlik maar dieselfde ding is, 
kragtig ondersteun." He points out to " ... die sinloosheid 
daarvan om vergelding as In doelwit van straf te beskryf - dit 
beteken dat vergelding 1 n doelwi t van sigself is." He points out 
: "Iets wat terugskouend is, word baie moeilik ook 1 n doelwit of 
1 n oogmerk wat noodwendig voorui tskouend moet wees. " Unlike the 
relative theories which look to the future, retribution is of 
a retrospective nature. This view is well taken. To the extent 
for instance that retribution serves to prevent that members of 
the community take the law into their own hands it has an 
objective; it is not itself the objective. It is a justified 
response to the commission of a crime. "Geskiedkundig beskou, 
het vergelding die rol van weerwraak oorgeneem hoofsaaklik as 
regverdiging vir die staat om te mag straf. 1150 
Reflecting on the importance of retribution in punishment 
Ferreira51 observes: "Trouens die wese van straf kan nie 
verduidelik word sander verwysing na vergelding nie." 
Rabie and Strauss52 also observe that "it would appear that the 
criminal law cannot exist without this theory.... After all, the 
49 
50 
51 
52 
"Die oogmerk van vergelding uit die oogpunt van die 
konstitusionele hof" 1996 (59) THRHR 267-276 at 272 
op cit note 49 at 274 
Strafprosesreg in die laer howe (1979) 2nd edition 
Johannesburg Juta & Co at 621 
op cit note 43 at 42 
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essence of punishment cannot be explained without reference to 
retribution.tt 
Retribution addresses society's desire for what it regards as 
deserved pain (not necessarily physical pain) to be suffered by 
the criminal because he has broken the law and hurt someone else. 
Caldwell 53 observes that having failed in his duties every member 
of the community is expected to perform, the offender must pay 
in pain and discomfort the debt he owes to society. 
Fitzgerald54 states : "It is true that to prohibit an act without 
fixing a penalty for contravention would be an empty threat and 
to fail to execute the punishment fixed, would likewise reduce 
the law to an empty threat". 
The theory is based on the premise that the commission of a crime 
disturbs the balance of the legal order, which will only be 
restored once the offender has been punished for his crime; if 
a rule has been contravened, the balance of the scales of justice 
has been disturbed and can be restored only by means of fair 
retribution. 55 
Tappan 5 6 reflects: " ... an impartial administration of retributive 
penalties by the state does satisfy the public sense of justice 
and ... the sadistic and aggressive impulses in the community. 
In the public mind the man who rapes, kidnaps, murders or steals 
deserves to be punished with severity, without regard to whether 
that treatment will make it better or worse or whether it will 
deter him or others from crime." 
53 Criminology (1965) 2nd edition New York Ronald Press at 390 
54 Criminal law and punishment (1962) Oxford Clarendon at 204 
55 Snyrnan op cit note 18 at 19 
56 op cit note 48 at 242 
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In a sense the community's feelings of revenge and hatred against 
the offender should be sublimated in the punishment imposed in 
order to prevent self-help by the aggrieved members of society. 57 
Gibbs 58 observes that to the extent that victims demand 
retribution, punishment of cr1me is something more than 
vengeance; it is at the same time a means of controlling 
vengeance. The differences between retribution and vengeance 
will be highlighted later in this work. Many crimes would be 
privately avenged if there were no prospects of legal punishment 
because, as Gibbs states, "even in contemporary societies, there 
are isolated instances where victims of a crime or the victim's 
surrogate assault the suspected perpetrator. Hence the question 
how many more crimes would be privately avenged if there were no 
prospects of legal punishment." 
Hospers expresses the view that a state of moral imbalance and 
injustice would result if no retribution were exacted. 59 
Vosloo60 is of supportive view and points out that from a 
retributivist point of view ''it is morally repugnant that a man 
should do an injury to another man without suffering injury 
himself; and that the penalty must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence." 
Society's right to punish criminal violations lies in its duty 
to secure rights or in its duty, as an expression of the co~on 
will, to maintain itself. 
Retributivism does have an answer to the utilitarian argument 
that it senselessly imposes misery without "counterveiling good". 
57 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 3-12 
58 Crime punishment and deterrence (1975) University of Arizona 
at 82-83 
59 op cit note 24 at 452 
60 "Symposium on capital punishment" 1975 Acta juridica at 225 
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Retribution does have something important to say about what 
should happen to the criminal during punishment. Retributivism 
requires that, consistent with the content of the no-nonsense 
message in each case, there is the perfect duty not to harm 
criminals beyond the harshness due to them and at least the 
imperfect duty to help them help themselves to return to society 
as fit members thereof - imperfect because the criminal has no 
enforceable right to whatever help utility may afford. 61 
Kant justified punishment and infliction of suffering as a 
categorical imperative. 62 He is quoted as stating that if 
civilization were to come to an end, e.g. if an island society 
decided to dissolve at once with its members spreading themselves 
over the rest of the earth, it would still be necessary to 
execute the last murderer before the dissolution of the 
society. 63 Kant insisted on punishment as an imperative of 
ethical justice. 
The cardinal theme in the absolute theory is that punishment is 
appropriate because the offender has committed a crime and 
therefore deserves blame and condemnation. 64 In this regard 
Rabie and Strauss65 state that "punishment is necessary to retain 
the community's respect for the criminal law in that it serves 
to sustain the morale of the conformists and that it is a means 
through which members of the community are dissuaded from taking 
the law into their own hands, or at least from relaxing their 
61 Dais in Cragg Retributivism and its critics: Canadian section 
of the international society for philosophy of law and social 
philosophy (CR IVR) : PAPERS (1992) volume 47 at 115 
62 Grosheide & van Itterzon Christelijke Encyclopedia ( 1961) VI 
Saadja - Zwolle Kok & Kampen at 272 
63 Byrd SB 1989 Kant's theory of punishment : Law and philosophy 
An international journal for jurisprudence and legal 
philosophy volume 8 (1989) Kluwer Academic Publishers London 
at 151 
64 Bean Punishment : a philosophical and crilninological inquiry 
(1981) Oxford Martin Robertson at 13 
65 op cit note 43 at 47 
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inhibitions." 
The absolute theories sought justification for punishment in the 
criminal act. The commission of the crime itself was sufficient 
justification for punishment. 66 In this respect punishment 
serves as an absolute requirement. 
Thus retribution through the courts serves as a vehicle conveying 
society's condemnation of the offender and his conduct, 
particularly in serious cases in the sentences imposed. 
The approach of Kant starts from the criminal's rationality, and 
infers from it the criminal's authorization of the victim's right 
to do to the criminal what he has done to the victim. Hegel 
approached the matter from the victim's equality with the 
criminal, and infers from it the victim's right to do to the 
criminal what the criminal has done to the victim. 67 Morris 
states also that "when a rational being decides to act in a 
certain way toward his fellows, he implicitly authorises similar 
action by his fellows towards him. 1168 
Stahl69 regards punishment as a divine imperative in the light of 
the Biblical provisions70 which convey that the governments are 
an "agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer" The 
governments serve as agents of God in ensuring that the laws are 
obeyed. 
3.1.1.1 Retribution and just deserts 
The punisher can be sure that whatever else he may or may not be 
66 Grosheide Christelijke encyclopedia (1956) deel v Kampen 
kok at 272 
67 Reiman in Baird and Rosenbaum Philosophy of punishment ( 1988) 
New York Prometheus at 115 
68 Morris in Baird and Rosenbaum op cit note 67 at 114 
69 Grosheide op cit note 66 at 272 
70 Holy Bible op cit note 45 Romans 13:14 
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achieving he is at least inflicting more or less what the 
offender deserves. If he is a thoroughgoing retributivist he 
regards it as his duty to do so; he is under a moral obligation 
to inflict deserts. 71 
Once the guilt of the person has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt, punishment is deserved. 
Sykes72 submits that in punishment the offender receives his just 
deserts. Retribution implies the unpleasantness or pain deserved 
by the offenders through their transgression of the law73 They 
deserve punishment because they, out of their own free will, 
chose to commit a crime. 
Retribution strives for justice rather than rehabilitation of the 
offender. The principle of just deserts as expressed through 
retribution implies imposition of punishment in relation to the 
seriousness of the crime or the harm caused to the community. 
The offender is not harmed beyond the harshness due to him. 
3.1.1.2 Retribution and vengeance 
There exists a measure of confusion about the nature of 
punishment and retribution. This brief discussion referring to 
revenge aims to salvage the term 'retribution' from the negative 
connotation which attaches to vengeance. Referring to retribution 
Morkel 74 states: "Losstande van die ander teorie~ is dit egter 'n 
lee en barbaarse argaisme wat geen plek in 'n ontwikkelde 
strafregstelsel verdien nie, aangesien dit niks anders is as 
71 Walker Why punish (1991) Oxford New York at 67 
72 The society of captives : a study of maximum society prison 
(1978) Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press at 
66 
73 Caldwell op cit note 22 at 420 
74 1975 De jure "Vergelding as teorie van straf" at 49 
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wraak in bedekte vorm nie." Reid75 refers throughout to the 
philosophy of revenge and retribution without distinguishing 
between them. A different view is expressed by the court in s 
v Motsoesoana 76 11 •••• I do not see the retributive aspect of 
punishment as a supposed desire for revenge on the part of 
society but rather as an expression by society of its stern 
disapproval of the offender's deviation from the accepted norm 
of society for the protection of which common law crimes and 
statutory offences exist. Punishment in this sense seeks to 
uphold those norms." 
Other authorities do distinguish between the two. Van den Haag 77 
points out that unlike vengeance retribution is imposed by courts 
after a plea of guilty or a trial in which the offender is 
convicted. It is proportional to the gravity of the offence 
committed. Retribution seeks to restore an objective order 
rather than satisfy subjective craving for revenge. 
Whereas retribution follows after a process which determines 
whether the act concerned constitutes a crime or not, what 
purports to be vengeance might simply be an attack where the act 
avenged would, if subjected to scrutiny by a court, have been 
found to constitute no crime. 
In retribution the sentencing officer does not impose the 
sentence out of hurt, but as part of the community's reaction to 
a moral wrong which should be conveyed to the offender78 
Critics of retribution like Menninger79 pay little attention to 
75 Reid Crime and criminology (1976) Hinsdale H: Dryden Press 
at 496-497 
76 1986 (3) SA 350 (N) at 369 I-J 
77 Punishing criminals : concerning a very old and painful 
question (1975) at 10-11 
78 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 3-19 
79 Baird and Rosenbaum op cit note 67 at 47 
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the victims of crime and regard retribution as vengeance. To the 
extent that victims demand retribution, punishment of crimes is 
something more than vengeance; it is at the same time a means of 
controlling vengeance, to prevent instances even if isolated, 
where the victim of a crime or the victim's surrogate take the 
law into their own hands in self-help, underlying the importance 
of the question: How many more crimes would be privately avenged 
if there were no prospects of legal punishment?80 To protect 
society, "moet daar in gepaste gevalle vonnisse opgele word wat 
dit ten doel het om persone ... te ontmoedig om die reg in eie 
hande te neem en op ander wraak te neem 11 • 81 
3.1.1.3 Retribution as an opportunity for expiation and remorse 
It is a further justification for retribution that through his 
punishment the offender is given an opportunity for expiation and 
remorse. By suffering he must purge his guilt. His punishment 
must be proportionate to his moral blameworthiness. 82 
Once he has paid back his debt it is made possible for him to be 
accepted back into society. The offender reconciles himself with 
the legal order by undergoing punishment. 83 The offender is 
likely to readily reconcile himself with the legal order if the 
punishment is deserved and proportionate to the crime. He is 
given a moral justification for turning over a new leaf. The 
punishment will also alleviate guilt feelings, within the 
offender which, it is assumed, are aroused by the commission of 
the crime. 
80 Gibbs op cit note 58 at 82 
81 s v Phokela and Another 1945 PH H22 
82 Burchell et al op cit note 6 at 68 
83 Snyman op cit note 18 at 19 
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The Viljoen Commission84 equates remorse with mental suffering 
and observes that genuine remorse in the offender might serve to 
soften the victim's feelings and reduce the community's sense of 
outrage at the crime committed. This facilitates his re-
integration and re-acceptance into the community. 
3.1.1.4 Retribution and social solidarity 
Caldwell85 submits that the society's moral code is strengthened 
by the unpleasantness and suffering which visits the offender. 
Punishment is therefore justified and retribution fulfils an 
important role as it operates to enhance solidarity of the law-
abiding citizens in the community. Their loyalty is captured and 
retained. Confidence in the legal system is retained. This pre-
supposes that what happens to the offender by way of sentence 
reaches the knowledge of the community. It does not always do 
so. 
3.1.1.5 Retribution and causality 
Retribution is justified by some by its close link with the 
causality principle, an argument based on the school of thought 
that regards retribution as the inevitable result of behaviour. 86 
With all actions being rewarded in terms of their nature, good 
actions are rewarded by good, bad by bad and crime by retribution 
in punishment. The state is under duty to exercise its power on 
behalf of its subjects to punish the offender with a view to 
protecting the community. 87 There need to be correlation between 
the criminal behaviour and the resultant punishment. It is 
however essential to draw a distinction between offenders, be 
they children, adults, mentally disturbed, etc as punishment must 
84 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the penal system of 
the Republic of South Africa (1976) RP 78/1976 Pretoria 
Government Printer at 53 
85 op cit 22 at 421 
86 Hospers op cit note 20 at 107-108 
87 op cit note 43 at 21 
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not only fit the crime but must also fit the criminal and, in 
that respect, be individualised. 
3.1.1.6 Retribution through the cases 
The main purposes of punishment have been stated by the courts to 
be deterrent, preventive, reformative and retributive. 88 Of these 
retribution is recognised as "nog een van die onmisbare 
boustene ... vir die regverdiging van straf. 1189 
Retribution is not "legal vengeance" as 1s regarded by some to 
be. The courts do not recognise this as its role. "Die howe is 
nie hier om wraak te neem nie. Die howe sink nooit, ooit tot die 
peil van die misdadiger nie. Straf moet onder alle omstandighede 
menslik wees .... 1190 That is the moderation which retribution 
infuses into the process. 
Only retribution can 
Recognition of this 
decisions. "Te lig 
lend balance to the sentencing process. 
role finds expression in numerous court 
is net so verkeerd as swaar," thus inS v 
Holder. 91 It is in that regard that the court urged that the 
"penal element must, in serious cases of whatever nature, come to 
the fore and be properly considered, if punishment still has any 
meaning in the criminal law. 1192 In essence the principle here was 
that a serious offence should attract severer punishment. 
There were numerous cases in which, because of the seriousness of 
the offences, the South African courts considered that the 
adequacy of the retributive aspect was to be met by imposition of 
the death penalty. Various factors play a role here. The 
88 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) 862 A; R v Swanepoel 1945 AD 444 
at 455 
89 s v Van Vuuren 1992 ( 1) SACR 127 (A) 132H 
90 s v Groenemeyer 1974 ( 2 ) SA 542 ( K) 544 
91 1979 ( 2 ) SA 70 (A) at 80 
92 op cit note 91 at 81 
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blameworthiness of the offender as one of them (with due regard 
to all circumstances) is an important factor in the determination 
of the severity of punishment. In S v Majozi and Others93 the 
court took into account the horror of the crime, the callousness 
of the crimi~al and the frequency of its occurrence as having 
been such that perceptions, sensibilities and interests of the 
community demanded that the extreme penalty be imposed. Even the 
factor that the accused had an unblemished record had to yield to 
retribution and deterrence. An offence which evokes indignation 
from the public attracts a severer retributive sanction. 94 
An important role of retribution in the courts' sentencing 
process is its efficacy in giving recognition to the natural 
indignation of interested persons and of the community at large 
and to counteract self-help.· InS v Karg95 the court observed: 
"But the element of retribution, historically important, is by no 
means absent from the modern approach. It is not wrong that the 
natural indignation of interested persons and of the community at 
large should receive some recognition in the sentences that 
courts impose, and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if 
sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration 
of justice may fall into disrepute and injured persons may 
incline to take the law into their own hands." Retribution in 
the sentencing process serves the need to recognise and address 
the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for serious 
crime. 96 
Retribution is a principle for the measurement of punishment. 
Retribution as representing 'just deserts' should not be seen in 
the context of only ensuring severe sentences for serious 
offences but should be seen also to be the factor which calls for 
leniency where this is warranted. It operates in the sentencing 
93 
94 
95 
96 
1991 (2) SACR 532 (A) at 541 
S v B 1985 (2) SA 120 (A) 125A 
1961 (1) SA 231 (A) 236B 
S v Human 1979 (3) SA 331 (EC) 338A-B 
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process in the courts as a bulwark against excesses, be they 
undue leniency or undue severity. In S v Maseko, 97 in decrying 
a disproportionately severe sentence the court was, in essence, 
re-iterating against a departure from "just deserts." It is to 
be observed here that whereas in S v Karg supra the court 
admonishes ag~inst undue leniency, in Maseko supra the court 
., 
admonishes against disproportionately severe punishment. That is 
true retribution. 
When the courts proclaim as did the court in S v Du Toit, 98 that 
for punishment to be appropriate the courts ought not to view and 
punish the offender with a primitive spirit of vengeance, but 
ought to do so humanely in all cases, notwithstanding their 
serious nature, it is to meet the demands of retribution. 
From the foregoing, the courts' recognition of the role of 
retribution in the sentencing process is evident. The courts 
acknowledge retribution as requiring that punishment bears some 
relation to the gravity of the offence and the blameworthiness of 
the offender, and that in this regard he should receive no more 
nor less than what he justly deserves. 
3.1.2 The relative theories 
Supporters of these theories justify punishment on account of its 
utilitarian function. The justification for punishment is found 
in the future, not, as in the case of retribution, in the past. 
Punishment is, in other words, justified by the value of its 
consequences. 99 The relative theories of punishment comprise 
deterrence, prevention and reformation. 100 
97 1982 ( 1) SA 99 (A) 102 
98 1979 (3) SA 846 (A) 858A 
99 Rabie and Strauss op cit note 43 at 23 
100 Burchell et al op cit note 6 at 67 
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3.1.2.1 Deterrence 
Caldwell 101submits that by deterrence 1s meant the use of 
punishment to prevent the criminal and others from committing 
crimes. In order to accomplish this purpose, the offender is 
punished so that he will be held up as an example of what happens 
to those who violate the law, the assumption being that this will 
curb the criminal activities of others. 
The idea of deterrence is that man, being a rational creature, 
would refrain from the commission of crimes if he should know 
that the unpleasant consequences of punishment will follow the 
commission of certain acts. It is the inhibiting effect of the 
threat of punishment or its imposition which causes man to think 
before committing a crime. 102 
Another assumption upon which the idea of deterrence is based is 
that adversity of punishment always outweighs the benefits of 
crime. 
There can be no doubt that the fear of punishment does serve to 
intimidate or deter most people, a result of human responsiveness 
to danger that legal threats pose. 103 
3.1.2.2 Individual deterrence 
Individual deterrence is the concept that the punishment will 
deter the offender undergoing it from committing a crime in 
future. Individual deterrence operates on the notion of "once 
bitten twice shy". It is a means of protecting society. It 
101 op cit 22 at 395 
102 Rabie and Strauss op cit note 43 at 35 
103 Kahn op cit note 44 at 226 
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applies after the offender has been apprehended, prosecuted and 
convicted. It does not mean that the convicted offender must 
necessarily serve 
inhibit criminal 
his punishment. A 
conduct at least 
suspended sentence 
during the period 
may 
of 
suspension. There is a tendency to discredit this concept 
because of the relatively high rate of recidivism dispite its 
expected inhibiting influence. 104 
Criticism against this theory has pointed to empirical evidence 
that as many as 50% of the offenders who had served prison 
sentences were recidivists and therefore individual deterrence is 
unsuccessful. Rabie and Strauss105 counter this by pointing out 
that it must first be determined how many persons would have 
repeated their actions but for the punishment they had 
experienced. The empirical data reflects instances where 
recidivists are apprehended and convicted and provides no 
information as regards to the many offenders who do not again get 
entangled in the net of the criminal law. Van den Haag106 
concedes the lack of statistics and also argues that "though we 
have no proof of the positive deterrence of the (death) penalty, 
we also have no proof of zero, or negative effectiveness" and he 
goes on to say "our moral obligation is to risk the possible 
ineffectiveness of executions." He might as well have stated 
that our moral obligation is, in the light of his argument, to 
risk the use of deterrence in sentencing. 
3.1.2.3 General deterrence 
Andenaes107 describes general deterrence as the restraining 
104 Rabie an Strauss op cit note 43 at 25 
105 op cit note 43 at 25-26 
106 Zimring and Hawkins Deterrence The Legal Threat in Crime 
Control (1973) at 16 
101 in Bailey and Peterson Empirical perspectives Capital 
punishment and non-capital crimes; a test of deterrence, 
general prevention and system-overload arguments 1989-1990 
at 683 
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influences emanating from the criminal law and the legal 
machinery. Andenaes contends that "messages" are sent to members 
of society, including proclamations specifying those actions that 
are wrong and should be avoided, the expression of social 
disapproval of persons who violate the law and notice of what 
punishment persons might expect if they were to violate the law. 
Here Andenaes specifically refers to these as the educational and 
moralizing methods which appeal to conscious and sub-conscious 
levels and are more important in shaping conformity than is the 
law's coercive function of deterrence. 
General deterrence has the community as a whole as its focal 
point. The offender is punished severely enough to serve as an 
example to deter would-be-offenders from committing a similar 
crime for fear of similar punishment. 
Underlining the importance of deterrence, Zimring and Hawkins108 
observes that when confronted with a crime problem, legislators 
often agree that the best hope of control lies in "getting tough" 
with criminals by increasing penalties to achieve deterrence. 
One objection against punishment for deterrent purposes is that 
it appears to have very little to do with the offender himself. 
With regard to the argument that the punishment has nothing for 
the offender, i.e. he does not benefit from it, there is an 
argument that those who end up being punished do benefit from the 
existence of a functioning punishment system, since they too have 
received the benefit of enhanced security due to the deterring of 
some potential criminals as a result of their own punishment. 109 
The offender benefits from the deterrent effect which arises from 
his own punishment because his punishment operates to deter 
others and serves to protect him in turn. 
108 op cit note 106 at 18 
109 Reiman in Baird and Rosenbaum op cit note 67 at 112 
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With regard to the exemplary nature of the sentence Kant 110 
states: "Punishment can never be administered merely as a means 
for promoting another good ... for one man ought never be dealt 
with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another." 
Andenaes answers that "realistically societies often treat people 
in ways designed to promote the good of society at the expense of 
the individual concerned." As examples Andenaes quotes military 
conscription, the detention of enemy citizens in wartime, and 
other examples. If the community should gain satisfaction from 
punishment as an expression of retributive feeling, no joy should 
come from punishment in excess of that required to express 
collective feelings of outrage. The extra measure of punishment 
must be recognised as a cost, not insubstantial, to the community 
as a whole . 111 
The concern arises only where punishment imposed for deterrent 
purposes is disproportionately more severe than what would 
otherwise have been imposed in the absence of deterrent motives. 
The need to impose exemplary sentences does result in imposition 
of punishment at times grossly disproportionate to one that would 
normally have been imposed. These disparities will be keenly 
felt in cases in which the community's sense of just deserts or 
retributive justice creates a limit beyond which punishment seems 
unfair. 
The question of "exemplary sentences" became pertinent in S v 
Khulu. 112 The court referred with approval to Asquith LJ quoted 
in Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law where it was pointed out that it 
is not always observed that an exemplary sentence is unjust to 
the precise extent that it is exemplary. It may be expedient or 
even imperative, but just, it is not. The guilt of the man who 
commits a crime when it happens to be on the increase and incurs 
an exemplary punishment to curb it, is no greater than that of 
110 Kant in Zimring and Hawkins op cit note 106 at 36 
111 zimring and Hawkins op cit note 106 at 42 
112 1975 (2) SA 518 (N) 521 
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another man who commits the same crime when it is on the wane. 
In that case the judge is not administering strict justice but 
chooses the lesser of two practical evils. He decides that a 
moderate injustice to the criminal is. a lesser evil than the 
consequences to the public of a further rise in the crime-wave. 
Miller J observed that the sentence may be justified only where 
the injustice thereby done to the individual is moderate but he 
could not conceive of any principle which could justify, for the 
sake of deterrence, the imposition of a sentence grossly 
excessive in relation to the offender's moral reprehensibility. 
Such a sentence would not be fair and just. "What has to be 
considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and 
the interests of society. 11113 In S v Mbingo 114 referring to the 
prevalence of certain types of offences and the consequent need 
to impose sentences which act as deterrents, the court stated 
that even prevalence cannot justify a sentence which ·is 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the particular case with 
which the court is dealing. This represents the limit to which 
the courts would sanction the severity of deterrent sentences. 
The deterrence justification relies on the underlying hypothesis 
that human behaviour can be influenced by incentives. More 
particularly, the deterrence theory proposes that increases in 
the severity of penalties or the certainty of their imposition on 
offenders who are detected will reduce crime by those who are not 
directly sanctioned, and that imposition of sanctions on detected 
offenders serves to discourage at least some others from engaging 
in similar pursuits. 115 
The efficacy of deterrence has been criticised from various stand 
points. It has been argued that the fact that recidivism occurs 
at a high rate points to the failure of punishment to deter. It 
has been argued that there is no increase in the number of 
113 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) 540 
114 1975 (3) SA 532 (C) 
115 Thorn Retribution exclusive of deterrence an insufficient 
justification for capital punishment (1983) at 200 
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capital crimes in those countries where the death peanalty has 
been abolished. This argument has been criticised as failing to 
take cognizance of various factors which could influence the 
incidence of such crimes like the educational development of the 
present-day generation and the possible residual intimidatory 
effects of capital punishment. It is pointed out that statistics 
cannot tell how many potential criminals have refrained from 
taking another's life through fear of the death penalty and that 
the lack of evidence for deterrence is not itself evidence for 
the lack of deterrence. It means that deterrence had not been 
demonstrated statistically. 116 Kahn draws a parallel between the 
death penalty and a lighthouse which throws its beams out to sea 
to warn ships and states: "We hear about shipwrecks, but we do 
not hear about the ships the lighthouse guides to safety on their 
way." The death penalty, as do other forms of punishment do act 
as deterrents. They, like the lighthouse serve to warn and are 
perceived by the public whom they steer off from collisions with 
the law. If the death penalty as a punishment does not deter as 
it is argued, the same must be said of the other forms of 
punishment. It is not clear whether the argument then should be 
understood to exclude deterrence as a factor in sentencing. An 
argument against the abolition of the death penalty, an argument 
with which I agree, was that the lighthouse is not to be 
destroyed if no statistics of the ships it has saved can be 
produced; nor must the lighthouse of appropriate retributive 
sanctions be discarded because there is no evidence of their 
efficacy in the fight against crime. 
3.1.2.4 Deterrence in case law 
The role of deterrence in sent~ncing has been accorded 
significant recognition in the courts. Punishment is meted out 
inter alia not only to deter others from committing the same 
offence but to deter the accused from committing the same 
offence. 117 
116 Kahn op cit note 44 at 226-227 
117 S v Seegers 1970 (2) SA 506 (a) 511F 
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The deterrent element comes to the fore to meet various 
circumstances obtaining in each case. In S v Mtimkulu 118 the 
court confirmed the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment imposed 
for bag snatching although it was severe, in view of the 
importance of deterring people from the mean and cowardly crime 
that it is and in respect of which preventative measures are 
virtually impossible and in which it is so extremely difficult to 
trace the offender. 
In R v Dematema119 the court acknowledged the need for "a powerful 
deterrent in respect of activities involving grave social or 
economic implications for the community, coupled with the 
component elements of prevalence and difficulty of detection." 
Where the nature of the offence warrants it, the courts find the 
need for deterrence to come to the fore. In S v Du Toi t, 120 
referring to the nature of the offences of which the accused was 
convicted (assaults and culpable homicide), the court observed 
that they were "van so 'n aard dat dit die gemeenskap ter plaatse 
en ook te lande nie anders as besonder hewig geskok kon gewees 
het nie ••. " and the court decided: " 'n straf ter afskrikking meet 
gevolglik sterk oorweeg word." 
The role of deterrence has been acknowledged also in cases 
involving negligence and recklessness. In R v Bredel1121 the 
court observed that in a case of gross negligence the deterrent 
purpose of punishment must be emphasised. 
In s v G122 the court considered that the prevalence of the crime 
served to reinforce the need to take the deterrent aspect of 
118 1971 (4) SA 141 (T) 142C-E 
119 1967 (4) SA 371 (R) 373-374 
120 1979 (3) SA 486 (A) 857E 
121 1960 (3) SA 558 (A) 560 
122 1989 (3) SA 695 (A) 701H 
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punishment into account. This was the view in s v Blank123 as 
well. Where this need obtains, the court observed, the element 
of example will inevitably feature in the sentence. This is 
because the sentence must demonstrate to a potential offender the 
consequences of violating the law. 
3.1.3 The preventive theory of punishment 
According to this theory, the purpose of punishment is to prevent 
crime. This theory may overlap with the deterrent and 
reformative theories in so far as these are perceived as methods 
of preventing the commission of crimes. There are forms of 
punishment which aim to prevent crime without also serving the 
aims of reformation however, e.g. capital punishment, forfeiture 
of a driver's licence etc. This theory interacts with 
retribution as, if it were to be applied in complete isolation, 
it would result in the imposition of too severe punishments. Its 
application ought to be tampered by that of the retributive 
theory which knows proportion. The preventive theory is not to 
be applied where it is evident that the crime is not likely to be 
repeated as was the case in s v Hartmann124 where a doctor had 
administered euthenasia to his aged father who suffered from an 
incurable disease. He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment 
suspended for one year after detention until the rising of the 
court. 
3.1.4 Reformation theory of punishment 
The purpose of reformation is to readjust the offender to the 
demands of society by individualising the penalty: by fitting the 
punishment to the offender's personality rather than by letting 
the punishment fit the crime. 125 According to this theory an 
123 1995 (1) SACR 62 (A) 80F 
124 1975 (3) SA 532 (C) 
125 Burchell et al op cit note 6 at 78 
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offender commits a crime because of some personality defect or 
psychological factors in his background. 126 
The theory commends itself by focusing on the circumstances of 
the offender as an individual. The purpose here is to reform the 
offender as. a person so that he may become a normal law-abiding 
member of the community once again. The emphasis is placed not 
on the crime itself, the harm caused or the deterrent effect 
which punishment may have, but on the person and personality of 
the accused. 127 
In the evaluation of the various roles of theories, Van der Merwe 
proposes retribution to be the first choice in the aims of 
punishment. Rehabilitation should follow upon retribution in the 
scale of aims of punishment and he lists retribution as a 
precondition to rehabilitation and states that if retribution and 
rehabilitation should fail to reclaim the offender, then 
deterrence should next form the basic justification of punishment 
for the offender. Prevention should come into play at the end of 
the scale when it becomes clear that there is no hope of 
influencing the hardened offender. Here punishment like life 
imprisonment would be considered. 
126 Snyman op cit note 18 at 23 
127 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 3-14 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES ON PUNISHMENT 
4.1 The perceived erosion of deterrence 
The interview with members of the community of Nongoma clearly 
reflected serious concern about the escalation of crime in their 
midst, perceived to be the result of a failure to bring culprits 
before court, a position perceived to have eroded the deterrent 
factor in the fight against crime as the effectiveness of the 
--------~- -'"-·--·-"'····~·-·· 
threat of apprehensioi1_9-nd_p.1XR:ishment had-receded ___ considerably to 
a I?.c?illt: .... ~.b.i.~.the¥.~-PJ~;r;::~eived, enc01._1raq~~ crim:tnc3.l conduc.t ... ~~rkt:h 
------~~-~-i ~-~~-C:.i:.~.d ___ i!llP.!!!lJ-.ty~"' 
Another item of grave concern which emerged from the interview 
was that those criminals who could not evade detection knew that 
they were assured of release before serving their full term of 
imprisonment. Here the parole system and amnesties were singled 
out for condemnation. They were convinced that this too eroded 
deterrence. 
4.2 A deficiency of the retributive element in sentencing 
The interview clearly indicated that this community's major 
experience with the courts is limited to the district courts of 
magistrate and the traditional courts and to the sentences that 
these courts impose. These are the courts in their midst. The 
strategic placement of these courts in each district within the 
community would guarantee notice by the public of any retributive 
and deterrent sentences they impose. From the interview it 
became clear that the jurisdiction of these courts enjoyed no 
respect. They perceived a deficiency of the retributive element 
in sentencing in respect of crimes of serious concern to them. 
They condemned this position as a simple wanton failure to impose 
adequate sentences. It needs to be explained that although the 
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few informed understood the reason for the limited jurisdiction 
to be that less serious cases are tried in these courts, the 
large membership of the communi ties apparently did not. The 
communities call for severer sentences which these courts are not 
empowered to impose. 
The fines as sentences for serious crimes were perceived as a 
lame response by the government 1 s courts to crime. Van der 
Merwe 128 refers to Rabie and Strauss as arguing that fines have 
lost the moral character of punishment and are often seen as no 
more than a mere disincentive or even a kind of tax. 
As the interview progressed one elderly man reminisced over the 
history of punishment amongst the Zulu and described how the 
condemned people in the days of King Shaka and Dingane would be 
escorted to their death over a cliff called "KwaGoqanyawo" 
(literally translated - a place where feet are folded - a name 
which depicts a person's folded legs and feet frozen by death). 
There the condemned person would simply be clubbed to death to 
fall into the depths of the cliff. There is no historical 
verification of this, nor are the crimes known for which the 
punishment would be imposed. With an apparent nostalgia he 
pitted this treatment of offenders against what he described as 
"today 1 s mockery of the practice of punishment." These hard 
feelings were manifest with all. They represented a strong 
sentiment for severe sentences which, they perceived, the crime 
in their midst deserved. 
Mention must be made of an interview in 1994 with one young man 
who had been convicted for assault with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm at Emlazi Magistrate's court as a sequel to a brutal 
punishment he meted out in a "people's court." In an answer to 
my friendly enquiry as to the reason for what occurred in that 
people's court, he answered casually in Zulu : "UHulumeni 
128 op cit note 5 at 3-19 
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uyabadlalisa lababantu") literally translated : The government 
plays (lenient) with these people (offenders in society) . If 
that be the true reason, it signifies the potential of such 
perceptions for provoking serious urges of "self-help" in 
communities. The sentences are viewed by society as inadequate. 
It appears that in the criminal justice system the public focus 
is primarily on the sentence the offender receives. Members of 
the public generally react either critically or with jubilation 
to sentences imposed by the courts particularly for serious 
crimes. 129 The public evaluates the sentence against the crime 
committed and manifests disappointment where they perceive the 
sentence to be too lenient in the light of the perceived 
seriousness of the crime. Where the sentence is perceived to 
have inflicted just deserts upon the offender, the public returns 
from the courts with a manifest feeling that justice has been 
done. 130 These reactions could be regarded as barometers to the 
extent that they manifest themselves on the acceptability of the 
courts to the communi ties they serve. As the courts should 
always, in the sentences they impose, reflect a mindfulness of 
their duty towards the public, it is essential that such 
reactions not be disregarded by the roleplayers in the criminal 
justice system. 
129 See Figure 4.1 
130 See Figure 4.2 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Findings 
Punishment has been recognised since the foundation of human 
society. The present theories of punishment, retribution and 
deterrence have evolved from primitive times when blood feud and 
vengeance were the forerunner of retribution. Punishment 
philosophies underwent changes to the point where they eventually 
focused on the needs of society in terms of protection from 
crime, and the needs of the individual who deserved to be 
punished, ln terms of his reformation. The classical, neo-
classical and positivist schools all had an impact on the modern 
philosophies of punishment. 
The theories of punishment that have evolved are the absolute 
theory which embodies the concept of retribution, the relative 
theories which present deterrence, reformation and prevention as 
the aims of punishment. There is also the integrative theory 
which takes into account the offender, society and the interests 
of justice and integrates it in the consideration of appropriate 
sentences. The roles of retribution and deterrence have 
historical recognition. They are important considerations in the 
sentencing process. 
It has become evident from the foregoing discussion however that 
all these theories, although presented by their protagonists as 
entities capable of functioning independently, need to be 
considered together for purposes of determining an appropriate 
sentence. Although the focus of this work has been on 
retribution and deterrence it must be stated that the other 
purposes of punishment also each play a role, albeit differently. 
It is true to say that the operations of retribution and 
deterrence are mutually complimentary. 131 
131 Fitzgerald op cit note 54 at 204 
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The objectives and justification of the theories are reflected in 
the philosophical rationales of the various commentators. They 
underline the role of retribution primarily to inflict punishment 
as deserved, i.e. proportionate to the gravity of the offence to 
eliminate the need for private revenge by those harmed by crime 
and to maintain the social order. They underline the role of 
deterrence on the basic premise that criminals as well as other 
people who may be tempted to transgress the laws can be deterred 
by the fear of being caught and punished. 
Both these theories are subjected to attack, retribution by those 
who, in particular, favour rehabilitation, and who maintain that 
"treatment" and not punishment ought to be administered to an 
offender. It may here be mentioned that the Viljoen Commission132 
affirmed retribution as a fundamental criterion of a sentence in 
the South African legal system apart from its quoted affirmation 
by the courts. What may be considered as the best treatment for 
the offender may conflict with the need to deter others if 
rehabilitation were to be employed as the only response to crime. 
As to deterrence the major objections highlighted above have been 
that there is a lack of empirical evidence in support of ·the 
efficacy thereof and that it is unjust to punish an offender 
excessively as an example to deter others. To the first 
objection the response has been that the lack of empirical 
evidence of deterrence must not be regarded as proof of evidence 
of inefficacy of deterrence as the empirical data does not 
provide an answer as to what the crime rate would have been but 
for the deterrent measures. With regard to the latter objection, 
relating to exemplary sentences, the courts do recognise the 
propriety thereof but have placed a limitation on grossly 
disproportionate sentences.133 
132 op cit note 84 at 5.1.3.2.7 
133 op cit note 97 at 102 
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The South African courts acknowledge the role of retribution and 
deterre::J.ce as inportant objectives in sentencing as has been 
amply illustrated in the foregoing case law review. Not all 
courts appear to apply these objectives at all times correctly in 
sentencing as was highlighted by Terblanche134 on S v Kotze. 135 
This case is being quoted as an example of what does occur in 
courts at times in this regard. 
With a view to imposing retributive sentences upon two appellants 
the appeal court gave notice of intention to increase their 
punishment imposed by the Regional Magistrate to what it 
envisaged to be truly retributive sentences. They had been 
sentenced to 1 and 2 years' imprisonment respectively. The 
sentences were a sequel to a robbery in which R1 000.00 was 
stolen from a coloured man whose wife was injured in the episode. 
The appeal court expressed a serious view of the crime. This 
court altered the sentences of each appellant to 2 and 21/2 years' 
imprisonment respectively wholly suspended conditionally, one 
condition of the suspension being that the appellants refund the 
R1 000.00 to the complainant. 
What the public would witness here with regard to this sentence 
would be no more than an order for a refund of complainant's own 
money to him and the release of the accused to freedom. Proper 
punishment provides the accused with " ... die geleentheid om boete 
te doen en versoening met die gemeenskap te bewerkstellig. 11136 
The disturbed juridical balance also must be restored. As 
Terblanche correctly indicates although the balance may be said 
to have been effected to some extent with complainant upon 
receipt of his R1 000.00, no amends to the community is apparent 
in this sentence. The sentence does not assist to effect a 
reconciliation with the community. 
134 Die Landdros (1989) Volume 22 "Die swaard word swaarder" at 
24-29 
135 1986 (4) SA 241 (C) 
136 Terblanche op cit note 134 at 26 
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The intended increase on sentence was made dependent upon the 
occurrence of an uncertain event, that is, the fulfilment of the 
conditions imposed for the suspension of the sentence. In the 
light of the judges' expressed intention to impose an increased 
retributive sentence, Terblanche properly poses the question 
whether the ultimate sentence reflected this intention. The 
answer is obviously in the negative. "Die verswaring kan tog nie 
afhanklik gemaak word van 'n toekomstige gebeurtenis waarvan dit 
onseker is of dit ooit sal plaasvind. 11137 The public is not 
likely to view a sentence of this nature as adequate, 
sufficiently denunciatory or to represent an increased punishment 
and, as Terblanche correctly concludes, "(d)ie slotsom dat 
vergelding nie tot sy reg gekom het nie, is onafwendbaar. 11138 
It is necessary to refer to the punitive measures conferred on 
district courts. The jurisdictional limitations of the district 
magistrates courts to twelve months' imprisonment as provided for 
in the Magistrates Courts Act139 present a picture of inadequate 
competence to punish for crime. This was the perception with the 
members of the communities interviewed. The Government was seen 
to do no more than provide for sentences of a few months' 
imprisonment in the face of very prevalent crime in their 
localities. 
The sentences in these courts are of course generally 
commensurate with the less serious nature of the crime tried in 
a district court. Housebreaking with intent to steal and theft 
as well as theft were singled out as very prevalent cases of 
serious concern. Members of these communities were not aware 
that in general, the value of the loss or damage may distinguish 
these cases either as serious or as less serious. 
137 Terblanche op cit note 134 at 25-26 
138 op cit note 134 at 27 
139 section 92(1)(a) Act 32 of 1944 
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The problem here is that in the case of housebreaking with intent 
to steal for example, the trauma of returning to a burgled house, 
a house broken and left wide open and whose contents ransacking 
for loot had thrown into chaos, as they described the position, 
did not enable them to regard this crime as less serious; nor is 
the very prevalent theft of (admittedly) less valuable 
possessions regarded as less serious by members of these 
communities, who, with limited financial resources often toil for 
years to acquire their modest belongings which, to the affluent 
may appear to be of little value. To them the sentences are 
neither retributive nor deterrent. 
It may be that the limited jurisdiction available to the district 
court provides it with little or no scope to demonstrate the 
difference between serious and less serious crime, a position 
which would not perhaps obtain if their jurisdiction were 
increased to accommodate some serious cases which would attract 
higher punitive sanctions and educate the public into a 
realisation of the existence of the difference. Although the 
Magistrates Courts are strategically placed in all districts for 
purposes of despatching, to the public, sentences with a greater 
deterrent impact, this advantage will be lost until these courts 
are endowed with higher jurisdiction. Here, as may have been 
observed, in discussing sentence, reference has constantly been 
made to imprisonment. This is because this discussion generally 
relates to serious crime and, " ..•. the more serious the crime, 
the greater the possibility that imprisonment will be the only 
sui table sentence. "140 
The majority of people in rural communities are apparently 
largely unaware of sentences imposed on cases referred to 
regional courts where they attract sentences which match their 
serious nature. The retributive and deterrent function that 
would have been served by these sentences is lost to the local 
140 S v Blank 1995 (1) SACR 62 (A) 76 
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communities of very many rural areas where the regional courts do 
not ope::::-ate. Such cases are predominently presently heard in 
urban areas where the regional courts are based. 
The limited sentences passed by the district courts send wrong 
messages not only to the law-abiding members of communities they 
serve, but also to persons contemplating criminal conduct, as to 
the capacity of the state to hit back at crime. The same lack of 
meaningful jurisdiction goes for the courts of traditional 
leaders which, in rural areas, are represented in all 
communi ties. Their jurisdiction was, by the Black Administration 
Act, 141 limited to imposition of a maximum fine of "forty rand or 
two head of large stock or ten head of small stock .... " The 
deterrent considerations cannot be adequately accommodated in 
such punitive measures. Because these courts have no direct 
powers to order imprisonment they are perceived to lack 
retributive and deterrent capacity. 
Amnesties and parole are factors perceived to erode the efficacy 
of deterrence and to negate the retributive dimension. This 
arouses indignation. The public expects that convicted criminals 
shall serve the imposed sentences in full. This does not always 
happen. 
Lack of publicity of deterrent and retributive sentences is a 
factor which detracts from these objectives fulfilling their role 
fully. The fear of criminal sanctions cannot be instilled in the 
public's mind unless the threats of punishment and their concrete 
exemplification are communicated to that public. Presently only 
cases which are of particular interest to the media are 
publicised. It is worth noting that the success of general 
deterrence is dependent to a large degree upon the effective 
promulgation of the threat of punishment because "it is publicity 
and not punishment which deters. 11142 
141 section 20{2) Act 38 of 1927 
142 Rabie and Strauss op cit note 43 at 35-36 
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Although the public would wish for more, the level of the South 
African courts' retributive and deterrent responses to crime in 
sentencing is able to contain their mood. A notable exception 
presently is the Constitutional Court's response which has 
effectively outlawed the death penalty. The deafening outcry 
against the declaration of the death penalty as unconstitutional 
in South Africa may be a manifestation of the position where the 
rulers in their penal reforms have failed to take cognizance of 
the mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of 
offenders. The outcry is a manifestation of a call for 
retribution. Not even the promise of life imprisonment has been 
able to contain the outcry. 
5.2 Recommendations 
In the light of the foregoing findings, it would be essential to 
correct the perceptions of government impotence in the face of 
escalating crime. It would be essential to take steps that will 
ensure that deterrence and retribution deliver to their full 
capacity. 
It is a fact that if the public were asked as to what the courts 
should impose as a sentence upon a rapist, a great number of them 
would, without hesitation, demand: "castrate the brute." In this 
example the courts could respond in one of two different ways. 
They could give effect to the horrendous demand and descend into 
disrepute in the eyes of the civilized world or ignore the 
expressed public expectations and suffer the courts to be 
unacceptable. Here, it is only a circumspect modification of the 
expected retributive and deterrent punishment that would be 
accepted as a reasonable punitive response. It would not 
necessarily be as demanded by the public. In this regard it is 
urged that society's reasonable expectations be recognised by the 
rulers when effecting penal reforms, particularly if they impact 
on retribution. Full recognition of society's expectations with 
regard to retribution is essential if vengeance is to be stifled. 
-so-
"The thirst for vengeance is very real, even if it be a hideous 
thing, and states may not ignore it till humanity has been raised 
to greater heights than any that has been scaled in all the long 
ages of struggle and ascent. 11143 In this regard, while it may be 
proper to say " ... the rulers should lead, and not be swayed by 
popular opinion 11 , 144 rulers may not ignore "popular opinion" as, 
inherent in this, is the danger of the development of self-help 
and the mushrooming of "peoples 1 courts. " Those who effect 
reforms must keep in stride with the community and take full 
cognizance of the community 1 s interest in the fight against 
crime. The courts do recognise their duty in this respect. The 
court in S v Hougaard145 observed: "Maar aan die ander kant vervul 
die vonnis wat 1 n hof ople ook 1 n ander doel, naamlik om die orde 
en stabiliteit in die gemeenskap te reel ... Die hof, so meen ek, 
meet ook vir die gemeenskap aandui dat hy deur middel van die 
strawwe wat hy ople steeds gedagtig is aan sy verpligtinge 
teenoor die publiek." 
The amnesties and parole are perceived to detract against the 
effectiveness of deterrence and retribution. The age old 
prerogative of the State President which permits him to express 
his pleasure on particular occasions by granting amnesties should 
yield to a more constructive practice. The President ought to 
express his pleasure through some other medium than the 
unleashing of properly convicted and sentenced criminals upon 
mankind. 
As has been indicated above, the courts mostly in contact with 
the communities are perceived to respond inadequately to 
escalating crime, an incorrect perception created by their 
limited jurisdiction. This position could be remedied either by 
empowering particularly the district magistrates' courts with 
143 
144 
145 
Cardozo in Burchell et al op cit note 6 at 73 
Fitzgerald in Burchell et al op cit note 6 at 72 
1972 (2) SA 70 (A) 72 
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greater jurisdiction, for example, to a maximum of 3 years' 
imprisonment instead of 12 months provided for in the Act or, 
initially, by proliferating supreme court and regional court 
periodical sessions in all districts, particularly in rural 
areas. Those traditional leaders trained in law could be 
granted jurisdiction over more serious offences with a 
commensurate increase in penal jurisdiction. It may, to a 
certain extent, restore respectability to these courts. 
It is essential that greater publicity be given to deterrent and 
retributive penal measures imposed by the courts. With regard to 
deterrence, there is no doubt that the communication of the 
threat of punishment is of significant importance to its 
effectiveness. Consideration could be given to providing an 
official either on the establishment of each Magistrate's office 
or for a cluster of, say, 10 Magistrates' offices especially 
assigned the duty to provide publicity in the interests of 
deterrence and retribution. Then the constructive roles of 
deterrence and retribution will not be lost. In this regard, it 
is necessary that " .... the public should be much more aware of 
what is being done in its name than is the situation at 
present. " 146 This is important for the process of ensuring 
acceptability of the courts. 
146 Van der Merwe op cit note 5 at 4-20 
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